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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
EFFIE HOBBS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. Supreme Court No. 16217 
EDWARD T. WEHNER and 
JEAN \'JEHNER, his wife, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
---oooOooo---
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a mechanic's lien foreclosure and breach 
of contract action in which the plaintiff seeks to re-
cover from the defendants the sum of $50,950, expended 
by her in labor, materials and furnishings toward the 
remodeling and expansion oi.: the defendants' residence 
for which project she acted as their contractor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This action was tried to the Court. The Hon. 
John F. Wahlquist entered judgment for the plaintiff 
and against the defendants for the principal sum of 
$33,360, together with prejudgment interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law or, that 
failing, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Statement of Facts is presented within 
those rules of laws requiring the defendants to state 
the facts consistent with the Findings of Fact entered 
by the Court and favorable to the plaintiff. This 
Statement of Facts is drafted no broader than necessary 
to fairly present the fact pattern necessary by the 
defendants to support the legal issues on aopeal in 
this action. 
Plaintiff is an Idaho State resident. (Tr. at 1). 
Her husband died on July 6, 1974, leaving her an in-
heritance in excess of $500,000. (Tr. at 3). An Idaho 
building contractor named Ed Goble approached her during 
early 1975 to associate with her in the building con-
struction business. (Tr. at 64). Plaintiff thereafter 
formed the Hobb's Construction Com~any and commenced 
business in the State of Idaho during March, 1975. 
(Tr. at 2, 61). This company was individually owned by 
plaintiff as a sole proprietorship with r,oble designated 
as an employee. (Tr. at 65-66). The olaintiff function-
ed within the business as a "financing contractor", 
i.e., -she provided favorable interest rate financing 
for homes built by her construction company. (Tr. at 67). 
Goble's responsibility was to conduct and suoervise the 
company's construction projects, i.e. - the oreoaration 
and submission of a project bid to the client, on-site 
supervision, the selection of subcontractors and the 
-7-
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coordination of their efforts, the purchase of materials 
and the hiring and firing of employees. (Tr. at 65, 67). 
Plaintiff and Goble maintained their business association 
for the balance of 1975 through home construction pr~ects 
in Idaho. (Tr. at 68-69). None of the plaintiff's home 
construction activities required an Idaho contractor's 
license because Idaho law does not require the state 
licensing of those who build within the private sector. 
(Tr. at 66). 
The defendants have owned and lived in a small 
home in Ogden, Utah for the past several years. (Tr. at 66). 
The defendant, Jean Wehner, is the plaintiff's natural 
sister. (Tr. at 2). The plaintiff and the defendant, 
Jean lvehner, likewise have a brother, Ronald Brower, who 
with his wife live in Ogden, Utah. (Tr. at 184). 
Negotiations among these family members began in the Fall 
of 1975 for the plaintiff to remodel and construct an 
addition to the defendants' home and to build in Oqden a 
new. home for the Brewers'. (Tr. at 4, 69-71, 185). These 
negotiations were concurrent with the plaintiff's under-
taking to build another home in the Ogden area for a 
person named Allan Jackson, not related to the plaintiff. 
(Tr. at 69). The negotiations with the defendants resul~ 
in Ed Goble's preparation of rough draft nlans for the 
remodeling and the addition to defendants' home seen by 
plaintiff and final design and specification plans not seen 
by her. (Tr. at 5-6, 71-73, 75, 80, 83, 233). These olans 
-3-
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and specifications were thereafter used by Goble to 
solicit and obtain competitive bids from subcontractors 
to allow plaintiff to present defendants with an overall 
cost bid for the project. (Tr. at 75-80, 83). This 
procedure produced from Goble a written bid proposal to 
defendants of $18,000. (Tr. at 87-89, 91). This bid 
contemplated a furnished home computed upon standard 
construction costs of $7 a square foot for garage con-
struction and $20 a square foot for single floor con-
struction with the further provision that the defendants 
would do a portion of the labor. (Tr. at 90, 240-242). 
The plaintiff saw the written $18,000, bid proposal but 
did not participate with Goble in his solicitation of 
bids from subcontractors nor did she receive from Goble 
all of the bids so solicited. (Tr. at 78-79, 87, 234). 
Through Goble, the plaintiff similarlv submitted 
a $40,000, bid to the Brower~ to construct their pro-
posed new home. (Tr. at 203-205). 
Both the defendants and the Brewers elected to 
go forward on the basis of plaintiff's bid and to utilize 
p1aintiff as their contractor. 
203-204). 
(Tr. at 4-5, 7, 185, 
The plaintiff's agreement with derendants oro-
vided that construction within the $18,000, bid would 
be done entirelv at plaintiff's cost. (Tr. at 6, 92). 
Plaintiff was to receive no corrJnission derived from a 
?ercentage or cost-plus for~ula nor would she receive 
-4-
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a mark-up from purchased materials, fixtures and fur-
nishings. (Tr. at 6, 92). All materials and supplies 
for the project would be acquired through, and in the 
name of, the Hobb's Construction Company. 
(Tr. at 227-229). Similarly, all billings and invoices 
would be received by the plaintiff directly from the 
materialmen and suppliers and paid by plaintiff upon 
the business checking account of the Hobb's Cons~ 
Company. (Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46; Tr. at 5, 227-229). 
Lastly, plaintiff would furnish and carry the financ-
ing of the cost of the construction at an annual 
finance charge of 8% through either a real property 
mortgage or trust deed. (Tr. at 68, 93, 154, 156). 
This interest rate was less than that available through 
financial instutions and would be not invoked by 
plaintiff until the completion of construction. 
(Tr. at 92-93, 212). 
The same contractual arrangement was concluded 
between the plaintiff and the Brewers with a comparable 
finance charge established for the real property 
mortgage or trust deed to be provided and carried by 
plaintiff. (Tr. at 20, 69, 203, 212-213, 215, 227-228). 
v<ork on the defendants' home commenced with the 
acquisition of an Ogden City Building Permit, which 
permit was paid by plaintiff through the construction 
company name. (Tr. at 7, 97, 107). 
-5-
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Plaintiff completed the remodeling and addition 
work to the defendants' home during the last part of 
June, 1976, at which time the defendants resumed 
occupancy of their home. (Tr. 162). The total cost of 
construction was approximately $47,000, (Tr. at 99-100). 
The Brewers' horne was similarly started and completed 
within this same time frame. (Tr. at 185, 210, 227-228). 
Both the defendants' home and the Brewers' home were 
undertaken and completed by plaintiff pursuant to 
agreement in that all work was su~ervised on-site by 
Ed Goble or one of plaintiff's other employees; all 
subcontractors were obtained and their work scheduled 
by plaintiff's employees; all materials and supplies 
were obtained at contractor's prices through the Hobb's 
Construction Company name, and all materialmen and 
supplier billings were received directly by plaintiff 
and paid by her through the Hobb's Construction 
Company. (Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46; Tr. at 6-53, 212, 
215, 227-229). Defendants refused responsibility for 
the approximate $47,000, construction amount following 
which the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien against 
the real property. (Tr. at 59, 14 3-144) . 
Plaintiff has never acquired nor held a Utah 
State Contractor's License. (Tr. at 55, 58). She 
was personally aware from the outset of Utah con-
struction activities that t~e work to be done bv her 
on the defendants' home and the Rrowers' ho~e rcouired 
a Utah St~te Contractors License. 
-6-
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Plaintiff did not make personal inquiry or application 
for such a license but rather relied upon the expertise 
and representations of her employee, Ed Goble, that he 
would procure a license or otherwise insure plaintiff's 
oorrpliance with Utah law. (Tr. at 56-58, 94-95). 
Goble subsequently informed her that the arrangements 
had been made for the Hobb's Construction Company to 
proceed under the Utah State Contractor's License 
possessed by Allen Buxton, doing business as Personal-
ized Builders. (Tr. at 56-58). Plaintiff accordingly 
relied upon Goble's representations without further 
inquiry and allowed work to commence on the defendants' 
home and that of the Browers'. (Tr. at 57) • Allen Buxton 
was a subcontractor obtained by Hobb's Construction 
Company through Ed Goble to do certain framing and 
preliminary work on the defendants' home. (Tr. at 58-59). 
Plaintiff was subsequently advised by Mr. Buxton that 
no one within plaintiff's employ had approached him 
with the request that the plaintiff's construction 
company be allowed to work under his Utah Contractor's 
License. (Tr. at 95-96). The olaintiff never made 
personal inquiry whether Utah law was violated through 
the attempted or actual "assignment" of a Utah 
Contractor's License. (Tr. at 95). 
-7-
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ARr.UMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A l.o!ATTER OF LAW 
BY AWARDING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF 
WHERE THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE DEMONS~ 
THAT PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS 
OF CONTRACTING AND ACTED IN THE CAPACITY 
OF A CONTRACTOR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A L~AH 
CONTRACTOR'S LICENSE 
Defendants contend that the trial court erred as 
a matter of law by allowing the plaintiff to enforce her 
building contract against them when the evidence demon-
strated, without contradiction, that the plaintiff 
never possessed a Utah Contractor's License, notwith-
standing that she conducted business in the State of 
Utah as a contractor and notwithstanding that she 
functioned as defendants' contractor in the re~odeling 
and construction done to their home. (Findings of 
Fact, ,110). 
The Court allowed the plaintiff to recover on 
her building contract with the defendants upon the 
following two Conclusions of Law: 
a. the plaintiff acted in good faith reliance 
that she did have available to her a valid Utah Con-
tractor's License. (Conclusions of Law, ~:la). 
b. the plaintiff was not a statutory contractor 
because her contracting relationship with defendants 
was undertaken benevolently, all construction was done 
at plaintiff's cost with no gain to her, and that the 
income to be derived by plaintiff from financing the 
cost of construction was comnutcd unon an interest rate 
-v-
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substantially below that offered through financial 
institutions. (Conclusions of Law, Ub). 
Defendants submit that the foregoing Con-
elusions of Law entered by the trial judge are 
contrary to Utah law and constitute reversible 
error. 
part: 
UCA §58-23-1 (1953) provides in relevant 
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, 
co-partnership, corporation, association, 
or other organization, or any combination 
of any thereof, to engage in the business 
or act in the capacity of contractor with-
in this state without having a license 
therefore as herein provided, unless such 
person, firm, co-partnership, corporation, 
association, or other organization is 
particularly exempted as provided in this 
act. Evidence of the securing of any 
construction or building permit from a 
governmental agency, or the employment of 
any person on a construction project, or 
the offering of any bid to do the work of 
a contractor as herein defined, shall be 
accepted in any court of the state of 
Utah as prima facie evidence of engaging 
in the business or acting in the capacity 
of a contractor. 
In Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P2d 733 (1948), 
this Court applied the language within 
UCA §58-23-1 (1953), as follows: 
The authorities are fairly uniform to 
the effect that failure to obtain a license 
which is required by a statute enacted 
solely for revenue ourposes does not render 
contracts made by the offending party void. 
On the other hand, contracts made by an 
unlicensed contractor in violation of a 
statute passed for the protection of the 
public arc held to be void and unenforceable. 
-9-
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Our statute is so worded as to indicate a 
legislative intent to protect the citizen 
from irresponsible contractors. The 
statute, while not comprehensive, provides 
for a small license fee. Control over the 
contractor is given to the Department of 
Registration. Upon an appro~riate hearing, 
the Department may, for unprofessional 
conduct, suspend or cancel the license. 
Good reputation and integrity are essential 
to obtaining a license and the entire 
object of the statute is protection of the 
public against fraudulent and illegal 
practice, which have always been recog-
nized as a distinct characteristic of 
statutes, which are not mere revenue 
measures. The statute being enacted for 
the protection of the public, plaintiff's 
written contract is void unless it is 
competent and permissible for him to 
establish that the date when it was 
actually executed and delivered was later 
than the date of execution shown in the 
contract. 200 P2d at 736-737. 
Thereafter, in t-1oslev v. Johnson, 
22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P2d 149 (1969)., this Court construed 
the provisions within UCA §73-3-22, 25 (1953), which 
require well drillers to secure and maintain an annual 
permit. This Court found the statute to be regulatory 
and designed for the public's protection and accordingly 
held that the plaintiff's failure to secure a drilling 
permit rendered his contract with the defendant void 
and unenforceable. 453 P2d at 150. The Court expressly 
reaffirmed its holding in Olsen v. Reese, 
114 Utah 411, 200 P2d 733 (1948), and further denied the 
plaintiff recovery under the theorv of quantum meruit, 
as follows: 
-1n-
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We are asked to overrule the case~ 
of Olsen v. Reese, but we decline to do ~b 
for the reason that we are convinced the 
decision therein given is sound. 
In the Olsen case supra, this 
court did not pass on the question of 
whether or not the contractor could have 
recovered upon the theory of quantum 
meruit. 
We are unable to see why this 
plaintiff, whose contract is void, should 
be able to recover on the theory of 
quantum meruit. To permit him to do so 
would permit him to evade the law and 
recover for work which he is forbidden 
to pursue. If he got the reasonable 
value of his services, he might even 
prove more than his contract would have 
given him had it been valid. 453 P2d at 151. 
The Utah Supreme Court was once again asked to 
overrule Olsen v. Reese , supra, in Meridian Corp. v. 
HcGlynn/Garmaker Company, 567 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977). 
Before the Court was whether a contractor licensed in 
another state could recover on his construction contract 
in the state of Utah where he had no Utah license. The 
Court concluded that plaintiff was a statutory contract-
or and denied him recovery. The holding provided in 
relevant part: 
The Plaintiff in this case is aware 
of our clear prior holdings; however, 
he urges us to overrule the case of 
Olsen v. Reese (citations omitted). 
This we refuse to do. We think the 
case was procerly decided, and we 
confirmed the principles of law therein 
stated to be the law of this state. 
567 P2d at llll. 
-ll-
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UCA 58-23-3(3) defines a statutory contractor 
~ 
for whom state licensing is required with the following 
language: 
3. Contractor: Any person, firm, 
co-partnership, corporation, association 
or other organization, or any combination 
of any thereof, who for a fixed sum, 
price, fee, percentage or other compensa-
tion other than wages, undertakes with 
another for the construction, alteration, 
repair, addition to or improvement of any 
building, highway, road, railroad, exca-
vation or other structure, project, 
development or improvement, other than to 
personalty, or any part thereof; provided, 
that the term contractor, as used in this 
act, shall include anyone who builds more 
than one structure on his own property 
during any one year for the purpose of 
sale and shall include subcontractor, but 
shall not include anyone who merely 
furnishes materials or supplies without 
fabricating the same into, or consuming 
the same in the performance of the work 
of the contractors as herein defined. 
The term contractor shall also include 
any person who by advertising, or other-
wise, holds himself out as a contractor, 
but shall not include persons regularly 
engaged as maintenance personnel to do 
such repairs, remodeling, etc. as are 
casual, isolated or incidental in their 
nature. 
The language within UCA §58-23-1 and 
UCA § 58-23-3(3), makes no provision for so-called 
"good faith" noncompliance. Similarly, the decisions 
of this Court have never provided for a "good faith'' 
noncompliance argument. The cited statutes make 
mandatory that a person engaged in t~e business of 
contracting or acting in the canacity of a contractor 
comply fully with the law. The necessity for full 
compliance is underscored bv the provisions of 
-12-
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UCA §58-23-18, which impose criminal misdemeanor sanctions 
r;,. .. 
upon an entity acting in the capacity of a contractor 
w_ithout a license. A "good faith" defense of the type 
imposed by the trial court in this action would 
necessarily void the regulatory powers of the Utah State 
Department of Business Regulations and frustrate the 
objectives underlying the licensing requirements set 
forth within UCA §58-23-1 et. sec. The trial court's 
use of a "good faith" defense to allow the plaintiff to 
recover on her contract is particularly suspect in this 
action where the evidence is uncontradicted that the 
plaintiff knew that her Utah construction activities 
would require a Utah contractor's license but where no 
personal effort was thereafter expended by her to effect 
compliance. (Tr. at 56-58, 94-95). Plaintiff's conduct 
as a matter of law cannot establish good faith where she 
relies merely upon the representations of one of her 
employees and even then failed to inquire further as to 
their accuracy. (Tr. at 57-59, 95-96). Plaintiff's 
decision to enter the business of contracting and to 
act in the capacity of a contractor obligates her to 
discover and know the law of any jurisdiction into which 
she ventures. The same standard of inquiry and com-
pliance is applicable to her as to any other contractor 
within the industry irres~ective of size or business 
expertise and acumen. 
The trial court, independently of the "good 
faith" noncompliance issue, found that the plaintiff was 
not a statutory contractor within the meaning of 
-13-
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UCA SSS-23-1 and UCA SSS-23-3(3). The Court con-
eluded, as a matter of law, that the building 
contract between plaintiff and defendant was 
benevolently made and not the typical type of 
building contract made between a builder and 
property owner designed to produce income or 
profit to the builder. (Conclusions of Law, ,llb). 
This Conclusion of Law ignores the legal standard 
for defining a contractor within UCA § 58-2-3(3), 
and the basis of the bargain between the parties. 
UCA §58-23-3(3), makes clear that financial 
renumeration, gain, or profit is not a requisite 
necessary to impose statutory contractor status 
upon the plaintiff. This statute unequivocably 
provides that". . The term contractor shall also 
include any person who by advertising, or other-
wise, holds himself out as a contractor, ... " 
This legal standard i~poses statutory contractor 
status upon the plaintiff independently of consid-
erations of whether or not she derived financial 
gain or renumeration from the building contract she 
negotiated with the defendants. The record in this 
action is uncontradicted that the plaintiff held 
herself out as the defendants' contractor through 
the solicitation of bids fran materialmen and 
buyers, her use of her construction connanv name tn 
obtain a contractor's discount for all materials a~d 
supplies purchased for the defenda~ts' home, the use 
-14-
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of the construction company name to directly receive 
~¥-
all bills and invoices from materialmen and suppliers 
obtained and used by plaintiff for the construction 
to the defendants' horne, and the exclusive use of the 
construction company checking account to pay such 
billings and invoices. (Plt's exhts. 2-23, 25-46; 
212, 215, 227-229). This form of business organization 
and operation was not limited to the defendants' 
project but was similarly utilized by plaintiff in 
obtaining the contract for, and the building of, the 
Browers' horne. (Tr. at 20, 69, 203, 212-213, 215, 
227-228). Further persuasive, is that the plaintiff 
had concurrently undertaken the construction of a 
third home in the Ogden, Utah area for one 
Allan Jackson and that this individual was unrelated 
to plaintiff. (Tr. at 69}. Each of these Ogden, Utah 
building projects required the plaintiff's employment 
of laborers independently of those within the eMploy 
of subcontractors obtained by her. (Tr. at 51-52). 
The Memorandum Decision of the court and its Findings 
of Fact independently demonstrate ample evidence of 
the manner in which the ~laintiff conducted business 
and held herself out as a contractor within the 
statutory definition of UCA §58-23-1 and 
UCA §58-23-3(3}. 
Without regard to the language within 
~C~ §SB-23-3(3), which defines a contractor within 
-15-
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standards going beyond the presence or absence of 
·.~ 
financial gain or other compensation, the court 
erred when it concluded that the plaintiff was not 
a statutory contractor on the premise that the 
building contract at issue was a benevolent act 
and not the typical type of contractual arrangement 
designed to produce income or profit. This 
conclusion ignores the very broad ". . fixed 
sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensation 
other than wages, • ." language within 
UCA §58-23-3, which serves to make one a contractor. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this 
action establish without contradiction that the 
plaintiff's building contract with the defendant 
was negotiated by the plaintiff to be income 
producing. 
The basis of the bargain between the parties 
clearly contemplated that the plaintiff was to derive 
her profit from financing at 8% per annum the actual 
cost of the construction to the defendants' home. 
(Tr. at 68-69). The plaintiff intended this 
arrangement to be income profit producing. (Tr. at 92-93; 
Findings of Fact, '12; Conclusions of Law, 1ilb). Upo'1 
cross-examination from defendants' counsel at trial, 
the plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. c!O\v, Wh•2n the thing -.·as f'Ut tocether, 
then of course vou were to finance the 
thine Llnd also to ch:1rc;e t>·p, intore~t, 
then, ett ~ic"' 1 Lt. p2rcent on ··our rtonc", 
is tl1:1t true:' 
-lG-
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A. On the mortgage. I made absolutely 
no profit on the building. -~ 
Tr. at 92. 
Q. All right. Then as a result of getting 
involved in this thing, you were going 
to pick up the mortgage on their house 
and earn yourself eight percent on the 
mortgage, is that correct? 
A. On the mortgage. That is why I done it 
at that cost, so it wouldn't cost them 
so much. 
Q. You were making your profit on the 
interest you would be receiving on the 
cost of construction? 
A. That is true. 
Tr. at 228. 
The terms of the building contract negotiated 
between plaintiff and defendant were not unique to these 
parties. This same form of construction and financing 
arrangement was negotiated between the plaintiff and the 
Brewers at a comparable finance charge rate. (Tr. at 20, 
69, 203, 212-213, 215, 227-228). An essential basis of 
the bargain for both the contract negotiated between the 
plaintiff and the defendants and between the plaintif~ 
and the Brewers was that the plaintiff would undertake 
and complete the construction with no profit to her in 
consideration for providing financing at an agreed upon 
finance charge for the cost of construction accrued under 
each contract. (Tr. at 156, 203, 212, 236). The 
essential role which the plaintiff's financinq function 
played within th~ building contract negotiated between 
the parties is further amplified by the plaintiff's 
e:-:pL>nation of the rrovision within the r1echanic' s lien 
-17-
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filed by her against the defendants' property 
,,. 
providing for payment by the defendant upon com-
pletion of the improvements. Defendants' counsel 
asked plaintiff for an explanation of this 
provision and the following testimony was solicited 
at page 236 of the transcript: 
A. It means that there would have been 
a contract drawn for me to carry a 
second mortgage on the home. 
Q. You didn't expect a cash payment of 
any kind on the completion of this 
contract at all, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You knew that there would be extended 
payments over a period of time. 
A. Yes. 
Q. There would be a contract in that 
regard that provided for payment. 
Is that so? 
A. Correct. 
Relevant to this action, is that the financing 
arrangements concluded by plaintiff within the 
defendants' building contract and the Brewers' build-
ing contract were not unique and isolated transactions 
for the plaintiff. The plaintiff's uncontradicted 
testimony is that she organized the Hobb's Construction 
Company so that she could function as a financing 
contractor and that she in ~act functioned in this 
capacit~ within the Idaho home building industrv for the 
eleven month period prior to concludinn her building 
contract with de~cndants. ( '.:'r. CJ t G 7) . Dcfcr:du.nts do 
not dis~utc t!1~t t~1C\" rrccivc~ ~3vOr3hle tre~~~cnt ~ron1 
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the plaintiff which otherwise would not have been 
rN. 
afforded them but for the family ties between ~he 
plaintiff and the defendant, Jean Wehner. Family 
ties, however, were not sufficient to remove all 
of the plaintiff's profit making mechanisms as a 
building contractor. The defendants submit that 
their building contract was negotiated within the 
same foremat that the plaintiff had conducted her 
business for the past year in the state of Idaho 
as a financing contractor under the name of the 
Hobb's Construction Company. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants conclude that both Utah statutory 
and case law authority make the plaintiff a 
"contractor" within the meaning of UCA §58-23-1 and 
UCA §58-23-3(3). Plaintiff never possessed a Utah 
State Contractor's License any time material to this 
action. The holdings of this Court make her building 
contract with the defendants void and unenforceable. 
The trial court accordingly heard as a matter of law 
by allowing the plaintiff to recover on this building 
contract against the defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tris 
Attorney fo Defen 
Appellapts / 
427 27th Street/ 
Ogden, UT 8 44{)1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
r;;. 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered 
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to 
Mr. Richard Richards, attorney for Effie Hobbs, 
plaintiff, 2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah, this 
£day of March, 1979._ 
/ 
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